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BULLETIN OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES OF THE WAR

Published by the University, Iowa City, Iowa

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Monograph

THE STATE
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
IOWA CITY

SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES OF THE WAR

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SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES OF THE WAR

INTRODUCTION

The course on the issues of the war prescribed by the War Department for members of the Students' Army Training Corps was to be divided into three general topics, (1) the historical and economic problems of the nations involved, (2) their social and governmental conditions, and (3) their philosophies and literatures. Each topic was to be treated during a single term. Very wisely the Committee on Education and Special Training permitted the institutions which maintained units of the Corps some leeway in the evolution of the details of the course. Since the armistice was signed before the close of the first term, only a third of the course was carried out according to the original plans. The officers in charge of the course at the University of Iowa contemplated the publication, for the use of the University and of such other institutions as might desire to employ them, of three sets of syllabi. Only one set was completed, but, while the immediate purpose is no longer to be served, it has seemed advisable to publish this first syllabus as a record of the course and a guide for later study of the great war. The syllabus was compiled by the chairmen of instructional groups and edited by Professor Van der Zee.

At the University the course was organized in the College of Liberal Arts under a special committee consisting of the following persons: Professor C. H. Weller, chairman, Professor N. A. Brisco, Professor F. C. Ensign, Associate Professor Percival Hunt, Professor H. G. Plum, Dean C. E. Seashore, and Professor B. F. Shambaugh. After its organization the course was administered by the chairman of the committee.

Under the original plans of the War Department it was expected that members of the S. A. T. C. of twenty years and over should be transferred to officers' training camps at the end of one term. This condition made it seem wise to outline for the

period as comprehensive a course as possible under the first general theme. The committee in charge selected eleven topics, one for each week of the term. Instruction in the several topics was given by groups of two or more members of the University faculty, who should thus be able to confine their attention to a single subject rather than be compelled, less academically, to cover a large series of subjects, some of them quite foreign from the special line of study with which the instructors were technically acquainted. In execution this plan developed entirely successfully. The names of the instructors of each topic, with their regular departments, are as follows:

Topic I

Professor Gilbert Giddings Benjamin, Chairman	History
Associate Professor Glenn Newton Merry	Public Speaking
Assistant Professor Joseph Simeon Magnuson	Latin

Topic II

Professor Frank Edward Horack, Chairman	Political Science
Professor Benjamin Franklin Shambaugh	Political Science
Associate Professor Richard Philip Baker	Mathematics
Assistant Professor Clara May Daley	History
Mr. Aubrey Ward Goodenough	English

Topic III

Associate Professor Nathaniel Ruggles Whitney, Chairman	Economics
Assistant Professor Fred Emory Haynes	Sociology
Assistant Professor Clarence Wycliffe Wassam	Economics

Topic IV

Professor Charles Leonidas Robbins, Chairman	Education
Associate Professor Elbert Nevius Sebring Thompson	English
Assistant Professor Ernest James Ashbaugh	Extension Division
Mrs. Grace Partridge Smith	Greek

Topic V

Assistant Professor Jacob Van der Zee, Chairman	Political Science
Associate Professor Edward Henry Lauer	German
Dr. John Ely Briggs	Political Science

Topic VI

Professor Harry Grant Plum, Chairman	History
Professor Bohumil Shimek	Botany
Assistant Professor Herbert Funk Goodrich	Law

Dr. Sudhindra Bose	Political Science
Miss Eva Maria Campbell	English

Topic VII

Associate Professor Louis Pelzer, Chairman	History
Miss Estella May Boot	English
Miss Chloris Shade	History

Topic VIII

Professor Abram Owen Thomas, Chairman	Geology
Professor Wilbur John Teeters	Pharmacy
Professor Robert Bradford Wylie	Botany
Mr. Dayton Stoner	Zoology

Topic IX

Professor Edwin Diller Starbuck, Chairman	Philosophy
Associate Professor Clarence Marsh Case	Sociology

Topic X

Assistant Professor John Hubert Scott, Chairman	English
Mrs. Grace Partridge Smith	Greek

Topic XI

Associate Professor Sam Berkley Sloan, Chairman	English
Professor Charles Bundy Wilson	German
Professor Franklin Hazen Potter	Latin
Assistant Professor Frank Albert Stromsten	Animal Biology

Instruction was given throughout the term to more than 1300 men. The course was also made available to women, of whom about 225 elected it. For the men the course was given in forty-four sections, or classes; for the women, in eleven sections. Reference books in sufficient numbers for use in all study centers were provided by the University.

Testimony of students and faculty was virtually unanimous as to the value and intrinsic interest of the course. Interruptions due to the exigencies of introducing an unusual régime for the University and to a long quarantine for an epidemic of the influenza made the course less systematic than might have been desired for the men; the women followed it through with great regularity. That the course served to arouse a keener interest and a finer intelligence as to the issues of the war is indubitable. It also stirred many students—and, it may be added, members of the faculty as well—to the study of the questions involved in the war. The course was distinctly worth while. C. H. W.

TOPIC I

IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Compiled by G. G. BENJAMIN

I. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND THE DIPLOMACY OF BISMARCK

1. *The means of unification*
   a. The development of a strong Prussian army. Bismarck declared: "But Prussia must keep her strength intact for the favorable movement, which is too often missed. Prussia's boundaries are not favorable to the development of a strong body politic. Not through fine speeches and majority resolutions will the question of the hour be decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by Iron and Blood."
   b. The three wars
      (1) War against Denmark (1864)
      (2) Austro-Prussian War (1866)
      (3) Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871)
2. *The results of war*
   a. The unification of Germany
   b. The weakening of France
   c. Among Germans a firm belief in the value of militarism
   d. The Alsace-Lorraine question
3. *Diplomatic aims of Bismarck (1871–1890)*
   a. Isolation of France
      (1) By means of a division of parties in France
      (2) By the establishment of a French Colonial Empire
   b. Friendship with Austria, Russia, and Great Britain. Cf. The formation of the Three Emperors' League (1872)

c. The Congress of Berlin (1878)

(1) Purpose

(2) Results: the formation of an alliance between Germany and Austria owing to Russia's hostility to Germany.

"Bismarck aimed at isolating France in Europe and at encouraging the war of parties . . . . which would postpone the unity that was the first condition of a sane and healthy recuperation, and of a France valuable to the other allies. Great Britain, absorbed in domestic and colonial problems, was only formidable on the Continent if allied with a strong continental state. The Italian kingdom was struggling with financial chaos, unification, and the hostility of the Vatican. . . . . By encouraging French colonial expansion east of Algiers, a wedge was driven between France and Italy. . . . . Russia must be also isolated, for isolation from other European states meant dependence on Berlin. . . . . With Austria, Bismarck desired a reconciliation and an understanding which cut away a Catholic power from Catholic France."—Robertson and Marriott, *Evolution of Prussia*, 400–403.

d. The formation of an alliance by Germany, Austria, and Italy (1882)

(1) Purposes of the Triple Alliance

(a) To establish a great European alliance under the leadership of Germany

(b) To keep France isolated

(c) To control the diplomacy of Europe

(d) To obtain for Germany "a security in foreign affairs"

"Should the irritation in Russia increase to the point of war, Germany was sure of an ally. Should France yield to her desire for revenge and attack Germany, neutrality was assured; should France in a war be aided by Russia, Austro-Hungarian assistance was pledged."—Holt and Chilton.

(2) Results

(a) Military force as a deciding issue in international affairs

(b) The ultimate forming of opposing alliances by other powers

II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM 1890 TO 1914

1. *The dismissal of Bismarck and the ascendancy of William II.*
   a. Effect of Bismarck's downfall

"The one man who possessed the power to separate France and Russia thus disappeared. In Russia the disgrace of Bismarck aroused not merely surprise but dismay."—Seymour, 49, 50.

   b. Diplomatic policies of William II.
      (1) Maintain German prestige on the Continent

"Being deeply imbued with Bismarck's principles, William II had no illusions on the subject. The very system was in danger, which it was his mission to safeguard. If any one will read over the seven hundred and some odd speeches . . . . pronounced by the voluble orator who presides over the destinies of the German Empire, a fixed idea will be found in them. . . . . This idea is that Germany must maintain the position gained by her victorious war against France."—Tardieu, *France and the Alliances,* 162.

      (2) Render Russo-French entente harmless
      (3) To achieve world domination by means of
         (a) A strong colonial empire
         (b) Commercial supremacy
         (c) A powerful navy

2. *Steps leading to the Triple Entente*
   a. The Dual Entente between France and Russia (1891–1896)
   b. The Entente Cordiale between France and Great Britain (1904–1905)
   c. The Russo-British Treaty or Understanding (1907)

"A policy that aims to hem Germany in, to draw around us a circle of the Powers for the purpose of isolating us,

would be a very dangerous policy for the peace of Europe.'' —Chancellor von Buelow in the Reichstag, Nov. 4, 1906.

3. a. The Moroccan crises (1905, 1907, 1911)
   (1) The Tangier affair and the Algeciras Conferences (1905–1906)
   (2) Casablanca (1907)
   (3) Agadir (1911)

"Our peace is safeguarded not by such accommodation nor by agreements, but only by our trusty German sword, and at the same time by the feeling, which is probably in the minds of the French . . . . that we also hope to see to it that there shall be a Government which is determined not to let that sword rust when the proper time comes.''—Von Hildebrand, Agrarian Conservative Leaders, Nov. 9, 1911.

"Germany gained no prestige, but rather emerged crestfallen. Her press was full of severe denunciations. There was as usual the stereotyped complaint that Germany could not have her place in the sun! There was intense bitterness against Russia while Italy was greatly censured.''—Bracq, *The Provocation of France.*

   b. The Bosnian affair (1908)
   c. The Bagdad Railway and the Middle European Project
   d. Tripolitan and Balkan Wars, (1911–1913) and their results
   e. Conflict between German interests and those of England, France, and Russia

TOPIC II

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

Compiled by F. E. Horack

I. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM AND THE SERBIAN REPLY (JULY 23–25, 1914)

1. *The pretext for the ultimatum*

The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne on June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo. Austria had expressed an intention to have a reckoning with Serbia.

2. *The formidable character of the ultimatum*
It was intended to provoke war. An acceptance of its provisions would have sacrificed Serbia's sovereignty and independence. Delivered July 23, 1914, it demanded a reply within forty-eight hours.

3. *The ultimatum known to Germany before it was sent to Serbia*
The "decisive conference" at Potsdam on July 5, 1914.

4. *The attitude of the powers*
England, France, and Russia endeavored to preserve peace. The first attempts at conciliation were repulsed by Germany and Austria.

5. *The Serbian reply*
Serbia accepted without qualification eight of the ten demands made by Austria. Only a qualified acceptance was made of the other two, the unqualified acceptance of which would have rendered Serbia a vassal of Austria. However, Serbia offered to submit the points at issue to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers in case her reply was not considered satisfactory.

II. AUSTRIA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE SERBIAN REPLY AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST SERBIA (JULY 25–28, 1914)

1. *Scant consideration given the Serbian reply*
The Serbian reply received at 5:58 P. M. on July 25th, and the Austrian minister left Belgrade with all his staff at 6:30.

2. *Declaration of the Austrian foreign minister*
The Austrian government could not enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austrian note.

2. *Declaration of war*
In spite of all the efforts of England, France, and Russia for mediation, Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914.

4. *Germany's part in the trouble*
   Germany insisted that the conflict should be "localized," and that England and France should persuade Russia not to intervene, so that Austria might have a free hand. In this manner Germany endeavored to throw responsibility on the Entente powers, should war break out.

5. *Repulse of two further attempts at conciliation by Germany and Austria*
   Both England and Russia admitted that perhaps Austria had some grounds for complaint against Serbia; but England insisted that under the pretext of humiliating Serbia the humiliation of Russia must not be involved. Russia insisted that the territorial integrity of Serbia should be guaranteed, and her rights as a sovereign state be respected.
   a. Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation of the powers *not directly* concerned (which included Germany) for the purpose of finding a way out.
   b. Russia offered to confer directly with Austria. Germany would not agree to the first proposal nor would Austria consent to the second.

III. THE FIRST ULTIMATUM OF GERMANY TO RUSSIA (JULY 29–30, 1914)

1. *Negotiations by the Triple Entente and Italy in an effort to avert war*
   Germany kept insisting that Austria should not be brought before a European court. Sir Edward Grey proposed that since the German government officials objected to the form of his proposal for a conference they should themselves suggest a workable form. Germany would offer none.

2. *The first ultimatum by Germany to Russia*
   The mobilization of the Austrian army on the Russian frontier led to similar military measures on the part of Russia. Russia assured Germany that these military precautions were not directed against Germany.

3. *Germany's threat*
Germany informed Russia that if she did not stop her military preparations, the German army would receive orders to mobilize. Notice of German orders to mobilize appeared in the Berlin *Lokal Anzeiger* before Russian mobilization, and was then declared to be false, but Russia had acted on the information and ordered mobilization.

4. *German ultimatum withdrawn*
Germany, doubtful of England's attitude, asked on what conditions Russia would suspend her mobilization and withdrew the ultimatum.

5. *Russia's further pacific proposal rejected by Germany*
The Czar offered to stop all military preparations if Austria would recognize that the Serbian dispute had assumed the character of a question of European interest. Germany declared such a proposition unacceptable to Austria without referring it to her.

IV. THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE (JULY 31–AUGUST 3, 1914)

1. *The second ultimatum of Germany to Russia*
Although both Austria and Russia had mobilized, they had agreed that mobilization should not be considered as an act of hostility. Kaiser William sent a threatening telegram to Czar Nicholas complaining of the Russian mobilization. At midnight of July 31st Germany demanded that Russia stop all military preparations against Germany as well as against Austria within twelve hours.

2. *A new formula of compromise accepted by Austria and rejected by Germany*
On August 1st, Austria manifested a willingness "to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires (Austria and Russia) had equal concern." Austria was now willing to permit the great powers to decide what satis-

faction Serbia should afford Austria. Germany, however, refused to accept any formula and declared that Russia must submit to the demands of Germany.

3. *The declaration of war against Russia*
After the expiration of the time limit on the second German ultimatum the Czar sent a final appeal to Emperor William to continue negotiations. At 7:10 P. M. on August 1st Germany declared war on Russia. Austria did not declare war until five days later.

4. *The declaration of war against France, August 3, 1914*
France kept her troops six miles from the frontier in order not to provoke an attack while negotiations were still possible. Germany, wishing to crush France and then turn against Russia, struck first and manufactured her reasons afterwards. It was not easy for Germany to find a reason for a declaration of war against France. That French aviators had dropped bombs on German territory and other like charges have been proved absolutely false.

V. THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY ENGLAND AGAINST GERMANY (AUGUST 2–4, 1914)

1. *German belief as to England's attitude*
German statesmen had figured that owing to embittered party relations, troubles in Ireland, unrest in India, labor troubles, and military unpreparedness, Great Britain would probably keep out of the struggle.

2. *British diplomacy*
The German White Book itself admitted that Great Britain strove earnestly and energetically for peace.

3. *Grey's announcement*
Sir Edward Grey insisted that England would maintain her freedom of action, that is, England was "free from engagements." Circumstances and British interests would have to decide what stand England would take.

4. *Germany's "Infamous Proposal"*
   In return for British neutrality in case of war between Germany and France, Germany would promise not to take any territory of France in Europe. The neutrality of Holland would be respected; but in case Germany was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality she would evacuate Belgium after the war if Belgium did not side against Germany. Great Britain emphatically rejected this proposal.

5. *Grey's proposal*
   Sir Edward Grey held out the prospect of a league of peace (July 30th); but Germany made no reply to the suggestion. The German government, however, inquired on August 1st if Great Britain would keep out if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality. Great Britain refused to commit herself, but did say that she would not come in if Russia and France rejected any reasonable peace proposals.

6. *Violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium*
   a. German troops invaded Luxemburg on August 2, 1914.
   b. On the same day at 7 P. M. Germany demanded permission to pass through Belgium on the way to France, declaring that should Belgium resist she would be considered an enemy and be treated accordingly.
   c. Belgium refused to grant such permission, declaring that to do so would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray its duty towards Europe. German forces entered Belgium August 4, 1914, justifying their violation of Belgium's neutrality on the grounds of "necessity"—"necessity knows no law."

7. *Great Britain's declaration of war*
   The threatened invasion of Belgium brought from the Belgian king an appeal to the king of England for intervention, August 3, 1914. Great Britain thereupon sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding that she

respect the neutrality of Belgium. German invasion proceeded, and Great Britain declared war upon Germany about midnight, August 4, 1914. In the parting interviews of the British Ambassador with the German Chancellor, the latter declared Great Britain was making war upon a kindred nation "just for a word—'neutrality'—just for a scrap of paper."

VI. PROOF OF GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

1. *The decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5, 1914*
   a. It was decided that Austria should have a reckoning with Serbia and that if war with Russia resulted it would not matter.
   b. Germany's knowledge of the ultimatum to Serbia before it was delivered.

2. *Germany's support of Austrian demands*
   Whole-hearted endorsement the moment they became generally known, and unwillingness to assent to a conference of ambassadors for fear of diplomatic defeat.

3. *Testimony of Prince Lichnowsky*
   The German Ambassador to England declares in his *My Mission to London, 1912–1914,* that "we insisted on war;" and concludes that "it is no wonder that the whole of the civilized world outside Germany places the entire responsibility for the world-war upon our shoulders."

4. *Revelations by an ex-director of the Krupp munition works*

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE THIRTEEN DAYS. JULY 23 TO AUGUST 4, 1914

July	23	Austria issues ultimatum to Serbia
July	25	Serbian reply to ultimatum
July	28	Austria declares war on Serbia
July	29	Russian partial mobilization
July	31	Austrian general mobilization

July	31	Russian general mobilization
July	31	Germany declares "State of War"
August	1	Germany declares war on Russia
August	2	Germany issues ultimatum to Belgium
August	3	Germany declares war on France
August	4	England declares war on Germany

TOPIC III

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RIVALRY

Compiled by N. R. WHITNEY

I. EFFECTS OF THE GROWTH OF NATIONALITY

1. *Wars due to conflicts in nationality*

   "Nationality" defined as group consciousness or group egotism leads people in a given nation or state to regard themselves as dependent for their well-being solely on themselves, and dependent especially for this well-being on group action against other groups. The spirit is not one of coöperation with other people but rather of antagonism and hostility toward them.

2. *Nationalism, a boomerang to those peoples which foster it*

   Its economic results:

   a. Limitation of productivity.
   b. Government supervision and direction of industry.
   c. Lack of economic freedom for individuals.
   d. Special classes of population benefited at the expense of other groups.

3. *The feeling of nationality intensified by economic factors*

   a. Tariffs—the Zollverein and German nationalism.
   b. Shipping subsidies.
   c. Government supervised trade.
   d. Government support and encouragement for its bankers and investors in foreign lands.

   Germany has been most notable in the use of such devices.

4. *Conflicts between nationalities mainly over economic matters*

   a. Efforts by nations to extend their political power through economic domination and exploitation of other peoples.

   b. Motive "selfish." Justification "might."

      "The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passive races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur."—Ludwig Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie.*

   c. Most nations at one time or another have shown evidence of such desire, though none so blatantly and brazenly as Germany.

      (1) The old colonial movement—1492 to early 19th century.
      (2) Based upon mercantilism.
      (3) Rivalry between Holland and England in 17th century.
      (4) Rivalry between France and England in 18th century.
      (5) Victory of England, 1815.
      (6) Adam Smith and laissez-faire.
      (7) Middle 19th century attitude toward colonies.
      (8) Free trade and anti-colonial movement.
      (9) Cobden and Gladstone opposed to colonial expansion.

II. THE NEW IMPERIALISM—EUROPEANIZATION OF THE WORLD

1. *New interest in colonies since 1870*

   a. Disraeli and the Suez Canal.

   b. Result of industrial revolution and improvement in communication.

   c. Germany's industrial development after 1870 changed her foreign policy.

   d. Demand for colonies by England, France, Germany,

Italy, Belgium, Japan, Spain, Portugal, and the United States.

e. German Empire, a late-comer in the family of nations, found the best regions for colonization and exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, already occupied by others. Force to be used to obtain "place in the sun."

"We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect the colonies we now have, but to bring about the acquisition of others."—Manifesto of the German Navy League.

"It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us."—German Crown Prince, 1913.

2. *Erroneous notions as to value of colonies*

a. As markets. Reaction against free trade after 1870; protection and colonial markets; British colonies establish protective tariff; movement in England, led by Chamberlain; results of preferential trade not great—*e. g.*, compare Canada's trade with both Great Britain and Germany.

b. As sources of foodstuffs and raw materials. Advantage of importance only in time of war—and then it may be impossible of realization if the opponent has a more powerful navy.

c. As outlet for population. Germany does not need an outlet for population. In recent years there has been immigration to Germany larger than the emigration from it. Of those who have emigrated from Germany few have gone to her colonies. Mistaken belief, also, on part of Germany's rulers that colonies must be owned; that trade with a people not under her political domination means loss to Germany. This involves misunderstanding as to what constitute the gains of international trade. Result of misunderstanding—theory that trade follows the flag. Truth exactly the reverse of this; the flag follows trade and the business man.

3. *Real economic explanation of imperialism*
   a. Business interests dominant.
   b. Growth of capital since industrial revolution.
   c. Search for investments—larger returns from colonial investments. Concessions; investments in mines, rubber forests, plantations, railroads, etc.
   d. Business men desire vigorous colonial policy; spheres of influence; exclusive trade rights; and armament to support these policies.
   e. Investors and concessionaires take the lead and nations follow, *e. g.*, Cecil Rhodes in South Africa; the Mannesmann Brothers and French investors in Morocco; English investors in Egypt.
   f. Interests of private individuals confused with interests of nation. Every investment in a foreign land an "exposed nerve-end." The success of an English merchant or banker at the expense of a German becomes an affront to Germany, and *vice versa*. German commerce and banking so closely identified with government that defeat of German traders seems especially like a defeat of the government.

4. *"Arenas of friction"*
   Industrially backward and politically incompetent regions which possess ample resources and cheap labor, but are poor in capital, political experience and defense. Business men in various countries feel "call" to exploit these regions. Cf. Kipling and "the white man's burden."
   a. The Balkans.
   b. Turkey.
   c. Africa—partition.
   d. China—dismemberment.
   e. Latin America.
   f. Awakening of Japan.
   g. Russian expansion in Asia.

5. *Play for position by rival states*
   a. Kaiser's demand for "a place in the sun"—col-

onies, commerce, and international influence. He reverses Bismarck's colonial and naval policy. Government aid to secure foreign markets.

b. England's colonial position similar to that of individual who happens to own central business site.

c. Germany's fear of growing power and influence of France, and of Russian ambitions in Balkans and Near East.

d. English alarm at growth of Germany's commercial and industrial power from 1895–1905.

e. Germany's desire to hamper English expansion; Kruger telegram of 1896 and sympathy with Boers.

f. Two great coalitions formed.
   (1) Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, Italy.
   (2) Triple Entente—France, Russia, England.

6. *Germany beaten in Morocco*

a. Small financial interests of German bankers in Morocco; French investors gradually acquire large holdings; Emperor William decides to call a halt; the Tangier visit, 1905.

b. Algeciras Congress, Spain, 1906; France wins.

c. Another test of strength—the Agadir incident. Germany yields, 1911. War threatened but bankers not ready. Kaiser warns them that he expects them to be ready for war when next called upon.

d. France, supported by England, declares protectorate over Morocco, 1912.

e. Feeling among Germans that successful trade expansion and opportunities for attractive investment depend on maintenance of prestige and respect. Fear that Germany would suffer commercially and economically because of defeat in Morocco. Determination to re-establish prestige by military force.

7. *German ambitions in the Orient*

a. Mesopotamia and its possibilities. Germany gains dominant influence over Turkey, and builds the Bagdad Railway to connect Germany with Meso-

potamia. This is regarded as a thrust against English interests and is opposed by the British after 1899.

b. German dominance over Balkans necessary for protection of Bagdad Railway. Berlin, Vienna, Belgrade, Sofia along the "corridor" between the Baltic and the Persian Gulf, Hamburg and Bagdad.

c. Middle Europe to be Germany's economic empire. "The establishment of a sphere of economic influence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf has been for nearly two decades the silent, unspoken aim of German foreign policy."—Professor Spiethoff, in *War Cyclopedia,* p. 36.

8. *Are international conflicts over economic matters inevitable?*

a. Need for proper understanding as to the factors which promote economic well-being.

b. Need for recognizing that that which advances the interests of a comparatively few individuals does not necessarily benefit the great mass of people.

c. The interests which sometimes receive most recognition are frequently not the most important from the standpoint of the nation; *e. g.*, what difference did it make to the millions of German citizens whether or not the Mannesmann Brothers made a profit in Morocco?

d. Does one nation lose what another nation gains in international trade?

e. Wherein is the gain from international trade?

9. *Pre-requisites for harmonious international relations*

a. Abandonment of narrow and selfish ideals of nationality.

b. This involves ultimately the discontinuance of world-wide tariff discriminations—*e. g.*, most-favored-nation tariffs, protective tariffs, etc.

c. It involves also the removal of various other restrictions and discriminations which tend to make people of different states hostile to each other.

TOPIC IV

PAN-GERMANISM AND WORLD DOMINATION

Compiled by C. L. ROBBINS

I. MEANING OF "PAN-GERMANISM"

1. *Best sense: an expression of German nationality*
   a. National self-preservation. Passion to preserve and strengthen the corporate life of a great people.
   b. A defensive movement against surrounding nations.

2. *Less attractive aspects: "A system of international burglary"*
   a. An offensive movement against England.
   b. Purpose to absorb lesser peoples of Europe and Asia in a German-dominated confederation; "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf."
   c. To weaken or destroy such nations as cannot be absorbed or included in the confederation.
   d. Finally to Germanize the world, making the German language and Kultur universal.

II. BASES OF THE CONCEPTION

1. *Lofty ideals of the mission of the German people*
   a. Fichte said that the German was the only pure race in Europe and the only one capable of high culture.
   b. Religious conception: to build up the kingdom of God, one must be a true German and submerge self in German spirit. It is regarded as a religious duty to destroy "declining England, corrupt Belgium, licentious France, uncouth Russia"

and to rejuvenate exhausted Europe with a diffusion of German blood.

c. The conception is carried to the extreme of forgetting the universality of God.

2. *Economic necessity*
   a. Population had outrun economic resources—nearly seventy million people in a territory not as large as Texas.
   b. Larger export trade was enjoyed by other nations, particularly England.
   c. Constant fear of England's navy—danger of being cut off from English Channel.
   d. Necessity of conquering lands of adjoining states or to cease to expand.
3. *Plain jealousy and greed*
4. *Highly developed militaristic spirit: mission to be fulfilled only by sword*

III. PROGRAM OF THE PAN-GERMANISTS

1. *Plan of 1895–98: to unite all European peoples of German blood*
   a. The Kaiser sought connections with various thrones by marriage.
   b. The conception was enlarged to extend to unrelated peoples in Asia.
   c. The defeat of Russia encouraged further expansion.
2. *Plan of 1911*
   a. Definite plan for vast confederacy in Central Europe, from the Channel to Balkans.
   b. Submission of Balkan states.
   c. Political and military control of Turkey: Turkey to be aided in adding Persia and Egypt to her dominions.
   d. America to be exploited
      (1) South America to be colonized.
      (2) The United States to pay expenses of wars.

e. Directions of proposed expansion summarized: Berlin–Calais; Berlin–Riga; Hamburg–Salonika; Hamburg–Persian Gulf; Germany–North and South America.

VI. RELATION OF PAN-GERMANISM TO WAR

1. *Germany saw all her development due to war: only war to preserve the empire and add to it*
2. *Never willing to consider arbitration*
3. *The present war was desired in the interests of greater Germany*
4. *Ruthlessness was regarded a virtue*

V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAN-GERMANISM

1. *Historical background*
   a. Rise of Prussia. "Three centuries ago, Prussia was a tiny state whose many parts were separated from each other by the lands of her neighbors. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Hohenzollerns were petty princes, ruling over Brandenburg in the north of Germany; to-day they are the kings of Prussia, which has engulfed more than half the Teutonic territory and extends in one vast sweep from the Memel to the Rhine; they are German Emperors, and as such rule from Denmark to the Alps. . . . . In three hundred years the Hohenzollern domains have increased more than thirteen fold."
   b. Prussianization of the German states. History shows that the Prussian character has remained essentially unchanged through the centuries while the character of the Saxons, Bavarians, and other German states has gradually been changed.

   "More important than the immediate political results were the moral effects of the methods employed by Bismarck in the unification of Germany. . . . . The theory of brute strength,

of blood and iron had triumphed. . . . . Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and the success of the Bismarckian method, the German people conceive thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power and might that has directed in large part the subsequent course of German life and history.''

2. *Characteristic policies of the Hohenzollerns*

a. Governmental. Prussia has always been practically an absolute monarchy. While Germany has a constitution and a two house legislative body, the ministry is responsible to the crown alone and the Reichstag has little real power over the government.

''The Emperor is no doubt the most potent factor in German foreign and domestic politics, whether he rules personally like William II, or impersonally through a powerful statesman, like William I. This would not necessarily be dangerous to the world if the crown were always possessed of lofty ideals of ethical and moral responsibility and conduct. Numerous statements of Frederick the Great who is the ideal hero of the present Kaiser show that this has not been the case. On Dec. 6, 1772, Frederick the Great wrote to Voltaire, 'The world is governed only by skill and trickery.' ''

b. Religious and moral

''It is necessary to distinguish between public and private morals. For the state, self assertion is the greatest of all commandments; for it, this is absolutely moral.''

c. Greed

''The German people is so situated in Europe that it needs only run and take whatever it requires.''

d. Militarism

''For two hundred and fifty years, since the Great Elector, Prussia has always been propor-

tionately by far the strongest military power in Europe." The Great Elector found an army of 1,200, he left one of 30,000 and Frederick the Great left one of 195,000.

3. *The development of Pan-Germanism*
   a. Efforts at expansion. With no colonial possessions in 1884, Germany by the year 1911 had secured 1,128,480 square miles of territory in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands.
   b. Government control of:
      (1) Schools and universities.

      "From the earliest times to the present day, the Prussian Government has educated the young to an aggressive military patriotism and therefore it may be said that the German elementary school is a branch establishment of the German barracks."

      (2) The press

      "Public opinion! Public opinion!" a member of the German Foreign Office repeated in a tone which showed that he was honestly perplexed, "Why, we create it!"

      (3) The church
      (4) Industry
   c. Extension of German influence
      (1) In Austria and Turkey through financial assistance
      (2) In Turkey through
         (a) Reorganization of the army
         (b) Assuming a protectorate over Islam
         (c) Construction of railways
      (3) In all foreign countries through an unscrupulous diplomatic and spy service.

VI. DANGERS OF PAN-GERMANISM

1. *All solid basis for international life would be swept away—law, respect of treaties, etc.*

   "It is absurd to inveigh against wars of conquest;

the sole point of interest is the object of the conquest." "When a state recognizes that the existing treaties no longer express the actual political conditions, and when it cannot persuade the other powers to give way by peaceful negotiations, the moment has come when the nations proceed to the ordeal by battle."

2. *No nation however remote would be safe*

"Not only North America, but the whole of America must become a bulwark of Germanic Kultur, perhaps the strongest fortress of the Germanic races."

3. *No security of peace: war a legitimate and desirable phase of national activity and development*

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity."

"We have already seen that war is both justifiable and moral, and that the ideal of perpetual peace is not only impossible, but immoral as well."

4. *Nullification of all ethical ideas and ideals: conception of the state as superior to morals*

"Whoever cannot prevail upon himself to approve from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the Lusitania, whoever cannot conquer his sense of the gigantic cruelty to unnumbered perfectly innocent victims . . . . and give himself up to honest delight at this victorious exploit of German defensive power—him we judge to be no true German."

VII. CURES FOR PAN-GERMANISM

1. *Military*

A crushing defeat on the western front, or on the eastern front.

2. *Diplomatic*

a. Dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Chéradame holds that "all the racial elements necessary for the destruction of the Pan-German plan exist in Central Europe."

b. Creation of a solid Slavic state in the Balkans.

3. *Political*
   a. A German republic
   b. A league of nations to enforce peace. "When the present great war is over, it will be the duty of America to join with the other nations of the world in some kind of a league for the maintenance of peace."
4. *Spiritual*
   A return to the ideals of Schiller. The truly cultural and spiritual for the material. This applies to all nations.

TOPIC V

GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE AND OF WAR

Compiled by J. VAN DER ZEE

I. THE STATE'S RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL

1. *What is a State?*
   It is a political organization and has four elements: territory, population, independent supreme power, and government.

2. *German glorification of the State*
   Histories, books of philosophy—indeed, the whole literature of Germany glorifies the State as something mystical and divine, as an end in itself and not as a means to some other end such as the happiness of the individual.
   a. Frederick the Great and Scharnhorst stressed not the rights of individuals but their duties, especially the duty to sacrifice life and property for the State, which is the highest good. They laid the foundation for the German military State.
   b. Fichte believed the German State should be "a contrivance whereby all human virtue is to be realized to the full."
   c. Hegel declared: "The State is God on earth."

d. Bismarck and the emperors had a vision of the paternal State, of State socialism.

e. Treitschke said: "The State is a being infinitely superior to the individual and exists to realize an ideal beyond and above that of individual happiness." "History is a great drama and States are the actors in it."

3. *What is the best government for a State?*

a. The State must unite all power in the hands of a constitutional monarch who holds his position by hereditary, divine right.

b. The monarch should be supported and assisted by a social aristocracy, a hereditary caste: they together should be the mouthpiece of the State, controlling the higher offices, army, and navy.

c. The masses, indeed, may criticise, but should not originate measures. The democratic ideal of equality is impracticable. The masses had better "toil at the plough, at the forge, at the carpenter's bench."

d. The German imperial government.

(1) The king of Prussia was Emperor.

(2) The votes of Prussians appointed by the Emperor dominated the Bundesrath, and in the Reichstag Prussians were numerous enough to control. Junkers ruled Prussia.

(3) Prussia could prevent amendments to the constitution. The Kaiser and his appointees in the Bundesrath were the final repository of power.

(4) There was no universal manhood suffrage, but nearly 3,000,000 persons were engaged in Germany's civil service: hence in one sense the people constituted the basis of Germany's bureaucracy.

4. *What should the State do?*

(Brief answer: Everything that leads to the power of the State.)

a. Police work: punish transgressors against the law and protect persons and property, and so administer justice.

b. Promote "Kultur." This "Kultur," so highly praised by the Germans as their great contribution to the world's civilization, consists of many things worth cultivating.

(1) Education: by means of universities, high schools, technical colleges, and vocational and elementary schools. The State should train all the people for constructive effort of some kind—for efficiency in industry, commerce, and government.

(2) Aesthetics: the State should make some provision for the leisure time of the people.

(3) Glorious history and splendid traditions.

(4) Brilliant statesmanship: government by an aristocracy and an absolute sovereign.

(5) The administration of public affairs should be in the hands of a bureaucracy—the best talent available should serve the State. Hence orderliness, finish, and perfection.

(6) State socialism: the State should be an agency of service in two ways by providing for

(a) Productive socialism: the State should own the transportation system, telegraph, telephone, and express systems, mines, and financial and credit agencies; study foreign markets; and promote a merchant marine and education.

(b) Distributive socialism: the State should insure against death, injury, unemployment, and sickness in industrial occupations; and provide labor exchanges and other agencies for the physical well-being and conservation of the people.

(7) Social legislation. Compare the Kaiser's throne speech in 1888: "Introduce the soci-

alistic element into legislation—that is a further development of the modern idea of the State, the result of Christian ethics, according to which the State should discharge, besides the defensive duty of protecting existing rights, the positive duty of promoting the welfare of all its members, especially those who are weaker and in need of help, by means of judicious institutions and the employment of those resources of the community which are at its disposal."

c. Military work: to this the State should give its most solicitous thought. Build up a well-organized army with universal military service. If a State neglects its physical in favor of its intellectual energies, it falls into decay. The army produces both character and education. An army brings unity—parliamentary government brings factions within the State.

5. *What should be the individual's place in the State?*

a. The individual may be likened to a brick in some vast edifice: he exists in and for the State. He should be taught to love the Fatherland, venerate the Hohenzollerns, believe in the empire's destiny, and sacrifice everything for the State.

b. Since man really wants economic freedom much more than he wants political liberty, the State should give him strength, security, and material advantages, and in this way stunt his political instincts in order to avoid dangerous or revolutionary tendencies.

c. The State should emphasize the individual's duties more than his rights. "Verboten" may well sum up the law of the land; in other words, "Be a soldier, pay your taxes, and keep your mouth shut." Thus, reduce all to a common uniformity and docility, and stamp out individuality. Generations of barrack life have also helped to make the people submissive. Compare the Anglo-Amer-

ican theory that the State should exist for the individual and prohibit the influences which menace individuality.

II. THE STATE'S RELATION TO OTHER STATES

1. *Is it bound by international law?*
   The State may act outside and above the public law of Europe in order to secure its own safety. Expediency is the State's best rule and guide. All international law must bow before the State's absolute sovereignty —that can not be bound.

2. *Are treaties to be binding?*
   They should last only so long as it suits contracting States to observe them or *rebus sic stantibus.* The highest duty of the State is self-preservation: "our interest is our right."

3. *Should States arbitrate their differences?*
   No efficient tribunal has been or can be devised to adjudicate between independent States. War alone can settle quarrels: it is the international law-suit.

4. *How should a State conduct foreign relations?*
   a. Frederick the Great said: "The world is governed only by skill and trickery."
   b. Treitschke wrote: "The statesman has not the right to warm his hands by the smoking ruins of his country with the comfortable self-praise: 'I have never told a lie'; that is a monk's virtue."
   c. The State can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States, and any means are justified, even spying, lying, and bribing.

5. *Anglo-American theory*
   a. International public opinion does give force to international law—its judgments are terribly effective, and no State can ignore them with impunity.
   b. Brute force and vicious cunning may be the making of the German Super-State, but we have a

theory that "right is our supreme interest." The rule of law won against Stuart kings in the 17th century must be established throughout the world to the immense advantage of international relations.

III. THE GERMAN THEORY OF WAR

(Direct outgrowth of the German theory of the State)

1. *German apologists and eulogists of war*
   Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst, Fichte, Clausewitz, Hartmann, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Treitschke, Bernhardi, and Emperor William.

2. *Some German sayings about war*
   a. Bernhardi: "The Right to Make War," "The Duty to Make War." War gives a biologically just decision.
   b. Treitschke speaks of the moral majesty, the greatness, the moral magnificence, the sanctity of war "conceived as an ordinance set by God" and as "politics par excellence".
   c. "War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity . . . . war is beautiful."
   d. "It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests upon the army."—Emperor William II.

3. *War versus Peace*
   Germans scorn Kant's dream of an ultimate rule of reason and of permanent universal peace. "Mad books" on peace are the work of "weak minds." War is divine and necessary.

4. *How should war be conducted?*
   a. "The enemy State must not be spared the want and wretchedness of war; these are particularly useful in shattering its energy and subduing its will." The policy of frightfulness, ruthlessness.

b. "The law of nations must beware of paralyzing military action by placing fetters upon it."

5. *Ideas inspiring the German theory*
   a. War is a necessity for Germany: she must find a place for surplus population and markets for surplus merchandise. Colonies are needed.
   b. War is desired by God and nature.
   c. Germany must rule the world: that is Germany's mission for the greater good of humanity. The expression "Deutschland über Alles" is the boastful but not empty motto of the German State.

TOPIC VI

RUSSIA AND THE ORIENT

Compiled by H. G. PLUM

I. THE RUSSIA OF 1914

1. *Introductory: geography, peoples, and resources*

2. *Autocratic government*
   a. The Executive Power—The Czar.
   b. The bureaucracy. "Russia is the true home of bureaucracy. Its machinery to sustain such a system of government was necessarily vast in extent. In 1897 there was one official to every 292 inhabitants, or one to every 89 men. It includes in its personnel no Poles or other 'foreigners' but many Germans. The salaries at the top are very high, those at the bottom so low as to make some form of bribery necessary for the livelihood of the class."
   c. The police system.

"In all countries, the appearance of police as a special institution, has been coincident with the triumph of absolutism." "The Census of 1897 tells us that in that year Russia boasted of 104,500 police. Since 1897 this figure has incessantly increased; indeed, competent persons assert that it has doubled in the space of 10 years, *i. e.,* one for every 200 men. The system cost Russia $30,000,000.00 per annum in

salaries besides all the bribes and secret payments." "At the beginning of the war, it seemed to liberal Russia and the civilized world that Russian bureaucracy and autocracy were impregnable."

d. The Duma.
   (1) The revolution of 1905 and reforms leading to the establishment of the duma.
   (2) Its powers like those of the Reichstag wholly subsidiary to the ministry.

3. *Why Germany attacked Russia in 1914*
   a. Common ties between the two governments.
      (1) Both were strongly imperialistic with monarchs ruling by "divine right."
      (2) The ruling houses were strongly related by blood ties.
      (3) Germany was the "most favored nation" in trade and commerce.
   b. Causes for the break.
      (1) The Russian desire to secure an ice-free port for her commercial ambitions to the southeast.
      (2) The Pan-Slavic movement in Russia, strengthened by commercial ambitions, menaced Austria in the development of her expansion policy in the Balkans.
      (3) Industrial development in Russia had clashed with German commercial interests and bespoke the time when German economic influence would wane.

II. RUSSIA IN THE WAR

1. *Russia's aims and early campaigns*

2. *The Russian Revolution*
   a. The Kerensky government—its rise and fall.
   b. The Bolsheviki program under Trotsky.
      (1) Basis of power: peace, lands for the peasant, democratic government.
      (2) The Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

(3) Evidence tending to show Bolsheviki working for German interests.
(4) Failure of the Bolsheviki program.

c. The Czecho-Slovak movement.
(1) Basis of the Czecho-Slovak movement.
(2) Relations with the Allies.
(3) The program of the Czecho-Slovaks.

d. The Allies and Revolutionary Russia.
(1) Recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks.
(2) The All-Russia Committee and the Allies.
(3) Effects of the Revolution upon the war and upon peace.

III. THE WAR AND THE FAR EAST

1. *Japan in the Orient*

2. *Why Japan entered the war*

3. *America and Japan*
a. Causes for irritation: Japanese immigration, the United States' seizure of the Philippines, commercial rivalry.
b. Japan's Monroe Doctrine for the Orient.
c. No real cause for quarrel between the two powers.

TOPIC VII

WHY AMERICA ENTERED THE WAR

Compiled by L. PELZER

I. GERMAN INTRIGUES AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

1. *The German program against American policies*
a. Organization, persuasion, and apology.
b. Diplomatic protests and negotiations.
c. Intrigues, plots, and criminal activities.

2. *History of the German Military Information Bureau*
a. Establishment at 60 Wall Street, New York, in the autumn of 1914, under direction of Wolf von Igel; leased as an "advertising office."

b. Planning and aiding in criminal activities; violation of the laws of the United States; destruction of lives and property on merchant vessels; Irish revolutionary plots against England; fomenting of ill-feeling of Mexico against the United States; maintenance of the spy system under cover of a commercial bureau stirring up trouble in our munition plants; the bomb industry and related activities.

c. Exposure of the bureau by the *Providence Journal* early in 1915.

d. Discovery and removal of papers by United States secret service agents, April, 1916.

e. German protest against the seizures; German refusal to claim papers and bring on self-accusation.

f. Publication of portion of the bureau's papers by the United States in September and October, 1917.

3. *History of the chief plotters, intriguers, and criminal agents*

a. Count Johan von Bernstorff, ambassador to the United States attempted to influence Congress, November, 1915; sent a request to Berlin for $50,000 to influence Congress, January, 1917; implicated in sabotage plots; obtained a propaganda fund of $1,683,500 for Bolo Pasha, the French traitor, who was later executed.

b. Captain Franz von Papen, military attache, directed criminal activities.

c. Captain Karl Boy-Ed, naval attache, directed criminal activities. Both attaches were recalled in December, 1915, upon President Wilson's demand.

d. Bernhard Dernburg, German propagandist, defended Germany in speeches, magazine articles; his defense of the "Lusitania" act caused his departure in June, 1915.

e. Werner Horn attempted to blow up the bridge at Vanceboro, Maine; he was tried, convicted and sent to the penitentiary.

f. Robert Fay for conspiring to blow up ships by time bombs was sentenced to eight years but escaped.
g. Carl Ruroede, director of passport frauds, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
h. Franz von Rintelen was convicted of putting five time bombs on the "Kirk Oswald."

II. THE SUBMARINE POLICY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

1. *The three stages of submarine warfare*
   a. Period of comparatively inactive and legitimate warfare, August, 1914–February 18, 1915.
   b. Policy of restricted naval zone around the British Isles, February 18, 1915–February 1, 1917: to destroy every enemy merchant vessel within the zone; designation of safe routes for neutrals.
   c. Campaign of ruthless, unrestricted submarine warfare, February 1, 1917, to the present; destruction of *all* vessels entering the naval zone.

2. *Vessels attacked or sunk without warning*
   a. "William P. Frye," March 28, 1915; Chester L. Thrasher, an American, lost his life.
   b. British steamer "Falaba," March 28, 1915.
   c. Attack upon the American vessel "Cushing," April, 1915.
   d. Sinking of the "Lusitania," May 7, 1915; sunk near the Irish coast without warning and with loss of 1152 lives of whom 114 were Americans.
   e. Attack upon steamer "Nebraskan," May 25, 1915.
   f. Attack upon British liner "Orduna," July 9, 1915.
   g. Sinking of American steamer "Leelanaw," July 25, 1915.
   h. Torpedoing of British liner "Arabic," August 19, 1915.
   i. Torpedoing of French passenger steamer "Sussex," March 25, 1916; this was not a troop vessel, was not armed and never had been; about 80 passengers, including several Americans, lost their lives.

3. *Summary of correspondence on the "Sussex" case*
   a. German note of April 10, 1916: some other vessel, not the "Sussex," was torpedoed; very likely due to mine explosion.
   b. Secretary Lansing's reply, April 18, 1916: elaborate statement of evidence and affidavits of 23 Americans; identification of 13 pieces of metal as parts of a German submarine; the torpedo was of German manufacture and was fired without warning; warning that further sinkings would result in a break.
   c. German answer of May 4, 1916: promise that thereafter merchant vessels would not be sunk without warning or without saving lives of passengers and crew unless escape or resistance is attempted.
   d. Secretary Lansing's reply of May 8, 1916: acceptance of promise of abandonment of warfare as stated in previous note.
   e. Von Jagow's note of May 8, 1916: full admission that "Sussex" was torpedoed by German submarine.

4. *Conclusions and results of "Sussex" correspondence*
   a. A diplomatic victory for President Wilson.
   b. Substantial compliance (for about nine months) of the German government with the promise of May 4, 1916.
   c. Renunciation of all pledges in the decree of January 31, 1917: the decree for unrestricted, ruthless submarine warfare upon *all* vessels in the zone set forth.
   d. Severance of diplomatic relations, February 3, 1917.
   e. Resumption of submarine warfare against American vessels after February 3, 1917.
   f. Declaration of war against Germany, April 6, 1917.

TOPIC VIII

MOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN RESOURCES

Compiled by A. O. THOMAS

I. THE MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

1. *Fighting men*
   a. The American Army and Navy on April 6, 1917. The regular army; national guard; marines; naval men and officers.
   b. Methods for increasing the army and navy.
      (1) The volunteer system: its history and the reasons for its failure in the present war.
      (2) The draft system: evolution of the draft into the selective draft; the democracy of the system; local boards. Ages 21–31 yield insufficient effectives. Ages 18–45 provide ample man power.
   c. The new National Army and its training.
      (1) Intensified training and short courses at West Point and at Annapolis.
      (2) The Reserve Officers' Training Camps.
      (3) The Cantonments.
      (4) The Students' Army Training Corps.
      (5) The Conservation of Army Morale: Army Y. M. C. A., K. C., and kindred organizations. Educational program and recreation at the camps.
2. *Labor*
   Essential and non-essential industries; industrial reorganization; the wage problem.
3. *The Medical Staff and Nursing Service*
4. *Public opinion*
   Need for a healthy public opinion; four-minute men; Committee on Public Information.

5. *Women*
   National League for Woman's Service; Women's Land Army of America; Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense; Army Y. W. C. A.

6. *Educational institutions*

7. *Organizations for war activities at home*
   Liberty Loan campaigns; Loyalty Leagues; Four Minute Men; advertising experts; artists; interpreters and foreign language speakers; censors; motion picture campaigns.

II. THE MOBILIZATION OF MATERIALS

Available resources ample; their mobilization for war purposes a vast but imperative undertaking, as shown, for instance, by the housing of the mobilized population in thirty-two camps built in ninety days.

1. *Ordnance and ordnance supplies*
   Pre-war supply small; government control of ordnance plants; the Browning machine gun; rapid development of ordnance plants.

2. *Food and food production*
   a. The need of surplus food.
      Army a non-producing class; the allies had to be fed; starving Belgium and Poland; depredations of the submarine; Europe's production below normal; Australia, Argentine, etc., too remote.
   b. International and national food control.
      Regulated prices; prevented hoarding and speculation; eliminated waste. The Food Administration.
   c. Coöperation of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. The wheat supply; the live-stock and meat situation.

3. *Fuels and fuel distribution*
   Extraordinary pre-war demand for fuel. The shortage during the winter of 1917–1918. The coal fields

of the United States and our rank as coal producers. The Fuel Control Act; the coal conservation order; the stimulation of coal production. Fuel Administrator. Oil and gas.

4. *The iron and steel industry*
   Rank of the United States as iron producer. Home and foreign demand for iron and steel. How the United States is controlling and stimulating production.

5. *Manufacturing establishments*
   a. The War Industries Board: its powers and functions.
   b. Government management of factories and their outputs.
   c. Autos and trucks: standardization of makes and parts; quantity production.
   d. Aeroplanes, balloons and signal corps equipment.
   e. The Liberty Motor.

6. *Transportation and transportation facilities: the imperative need for increase and control*
   a. Ships and shipyards.
      (1) Steps inaugurated to increase tonnage.
         (a) Interned ships put into service.
         (b) Neutral ships commandeered.
         (c) The United States Emergency Fleet Corporation: establishment of new shipyards and construction of new types of ships.
      (2) Steps taken to protect tonnage.
         (a) Camouflaged ships.
         (b) Coöperation of the Navy: the convoy system; chasers and destroyers, and anti-submarine devices.
      (3) Some results.
         (a) Challenge of submarine met and worsted.
         (b) An enormous merchant marine—a salvage of the war.

(c) A great impulse to foreign trade.
(d) The United States destined to hold a commanding place in future shipping circles.
(e) Tremendous docking facilities in France.

b. Railways, rolling stock, and express lines: reasons for operation by the government.
(1) Unified control necessary as a war measure.
(2) Strikes and labor difficulties forestalled.
(3) Competition and congestion reduced.
(4) Railway equipment needed in France for handling troops and supplies; at present the United States has 600 miles of railroad and 250 miles of warehouses in France.
(5) Merger of the express companies.

7. *Rapid communication*
a. Government operation of telegraph and telephone lines.
b. The wireless service; cables and cable lines.
c. Mail to and from France.

8. *Chemicals, drugs, and dyes*
a. High explosive products; development since 1916.
b. From dye importing to dye exporting.
c. The production of optical glass.

III. THE MOBILIZATION OF MONEY

1. *Extraordinary demand for money and credit in war time*
a. Army needs food, clothing, shoes, rifles, etc.
b. Navy needs additional ships, coal, ordnance, etc.
c. Loans to allies; officers' and privates' pay; insurance.

2. *Methods of raising money for war expenses*
a. Liberty loans: how authorized; amounts raised; number of subscribers.
b. War savings stamps and certificates.

c. The War Revenue Acts: excise, stamp, and inheritance taxes; increased postage rates.
d. Income taxes.
e. Excess profits tax: some industries profit more than others from the war—they should pay a higher tax.
f. War Credits Act: short loans by government authorized by Congress; Treasury certificates.

TOPIC IX

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND IDEALS

Compiled by E. D. STARBUCK

I. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

1. *Democracy means the self-direction of all the people in the pursuit of their common interests. Its ideal is a self-directed community of free personalities. See other definitions.*

2. *The one deadly enemy of democracy is selfishness, greed*

3. *Four elemental facts underlying political democracy*
   a. Certain inviolable rights of man.
   b. The source of political power and authority resides in each and all of the members of the state: "popular sovereignty."
   c. Specialization of duties with relative autonomy of groups.
   d. The invention of representative government.

4. *Four fundamental principles of true democracy*
   a. Freedom; individuality; self-direction participated in by all.
   b. Loyalty; responsibility to the group; a common united life; duties that bind individuals into a community; universal spirit of good will.
   c. Fair play; the determination of freedom and loyalty along the lines of generosity and justice rather than of personal advantage.
   d. Spontaneity; the transformation of rights and

duties into opportunities; free personality finding its fulfillment through the group; sportsmanship.

5. *Aspects of the evolution of democracy*
   a. National freedom and sovereignty.
   b. Political freedom, *i. e.,* equality of classes and individuals *before the law,* and universal suffrage.
   c. Social freedom, *i. e.,* abolition of class distinctions, privileges and inequalities of opportunity.
   d. Moral and religious freedom, *i. e.,* full moral self-direction by the individual, and the decline of the coercive aspects of government.

6. *What democracy does not do*
   a. Seek artificial equality.
   b. Stand in the way of individual initiative and leadership.
   c. Oppose centralized authority.
   d. Encourage personal ideals incompatible with the group welfare; for example, the half truths of license, anarchy, "personal liberty," etc.

II. ORIGIN OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

1. *Selection, through immigration of the "common people"*

2. *Our European heritage tending towards individualism and freedom from autocracy*
   a. The Greek city-states.
   b. The English revolutions.
   c. The Renaissance.
   d. The French Revolution.

3. *Events and conditions in America that have accelerated freedom of individual, group, and nation*
   a. Compact of the Pilgrim Fathers, Nov. 2, 1620.
   b. The American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.
   c. Freedom and individuality of frontier life.
   d. The removal of property qualifications for suffrage, 1790–1850.

e. The Civil War and the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, 1861–1870.
f. Woman suffrage adopted in western states, 1869 to date.

4. *Conditions that have fostered coöperation, organization, good will—a true social body*
   a. Industrial—small free holdings of public lands instead of large grants to syndicates.
   b. Economic—unifying effects of canals, railroads, telegraphs, telephone, postal service, banking system—rendering easy the exchange of goods and ideas.
   c. Educational—the "common school" system. See the "Ordinance of 1787."
   d. Political—the unifying effect of public discussion and public adjustment of common interests and problems.
   e. Religious—Church Federation, coöperation, and the Social Service movement.

5. *Great prophets and leaders of American democracy*
   Samuel Adams, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson.

6. *The message of America to the world in the present crisis*
   a. Disinterested service.
   b. Morality in international relations.
   c. The recognition of certain inviolable rights of "nations," small and great.

III. THE TASKS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

1. *Make our democracy safe and stable*
   a. By a general understanding of the excesses of an unconstitutional democracy.
   b. By an adequate system of universal compulsory and free education.
   c. By definite training in citizenship.
   d. By race assimilation.

2. *Complete and perfect political democracy in all of its aspects*
   a. Attempted devices for more direct democracy such as the initiative and referendum, the recall, the short ballot, and commission government.
   b. Universal suffrage within the limits of justice.
   c. Social legislation primarily designed to recompense the individual when unavoidably injured by necessary social action.
      (1) Indemnity for detention on a false charge or other legal action. Cf. North Dakota law.
      (2) Rehabilitation of wounded soldiers.
      (3) Social insurance against industrial accident, unemployment, and sickness; old age pensions.

3. *Strive for the attainment of true social democracy*
   a. By utilizing political democracy, the natural instrument of social justice, abolishing all private monopoly, unjust privilege, and despotic power in the industrial world.
   b. By eliminating and preventing all hereditary parasitic social classes, and inaugurating a positive social effort to render the unfit fit.
   c. Cultivate a healthy scorn of caste and snobbery in every form. Autocracy rests on caste, favors promotion by birth and inheritance and makes invidious distinctions between vocations; democracy rests on "open classes," favors promotion for merit only and dignifies every useful vocation.

4. *Foster democratic readjustments in those institutions that mould the sympathies and ideals of children*
   a. The home, with its autocratic traditions.
   b. The school with its imperialisms.

5. *America's purpose in the world war*
   a. To emphasize justice as the enduring basis of peace and good will.

      "Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or

leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present rulers of Germany command. Not until that has been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peacemaker among the nations. But when that has been done—as, God willing, it assuredly will be—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is our time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.''—President Wilson's Address, December 4, 1917.

b. To secure the self-determination of all nations and of all lesser natural human groups.

c. To wage the first war against war.

d. To help organize a *society of nations* with executive powers, as the only way to disarmament and world peace.

''If it be indeed and in truth the common object of the governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price that will secure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreement of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

''That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed. That indispensable instrument is a league of nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws and only upon that word. For Germany will have to

redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

"And as I see it, the constitution of that league of nations and the clear definition of the objects must be a part—is in a sense the most essential part—of the peace settlement itself."

TOPIC X

OUR ALLIES: WHAT THEY BRING US AND WE THEM

Compiled by J. H. Scott

I. INTRODUCTORY: ALLIANCE FOR WAR

1. *Coalitions disturbing the balance of power*
   a. 1815, The Holy Alliance.
   b. 1872, The Alliance of the Three Emperors.
   c. 1879, The Dual Alliance.
   d. 1881, The Triple Alliance.
   e. 1898, German-Turkish Understanding.

2. *Counter adjustments to preserve the balance of power*
   a. 1891, Franco-Russian Entente.
   b. 1901, Franco-Italian Understanding.
   c. 1902, Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
   d. 1904, Franco-British Entente.
   e. 1905, Anglo-Russian Entente.

3. *Alignments during the present world war*
   a. The "Central" group: Austria, Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria.
   b. The "Allied" group: Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Egypt, Japan, Portugal, Italy, San Marino (Italy), Roumania, Greece, United States, Cuba, Panama, Siam, Liberia, China, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Czecho-Slovaks.

II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ALLIES' COUNTRIES

1. *Great Britain*
   a. External. A loose aggregation of peoples, centering in the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic stock of the British Isles (120,000 square miles; 46,000,000 population), and embracing in overseas colonies and dependencies about one quarter of the area and population of the globe (14,000,000 square miles; 450,000,000 population).
   b. Temperamental.
      (1) Isolation — insularity — conservatism. The Anglo-Saxon is highly individualistic, austere, and self-contained. He reveres traditional ways, whatever has been duly constituted or established; and shows rare efficiency in dealing with new conditions under ancient forms and usages.
      (2) Preference of action to intellection. The Englishman is interested in particulars rather than in generalities; in handling situations rather than constructing theories; he looks to cases rather than to codes. Abstract and purely intellectual pursuits he has neglected to make a world-wide reputation as sportsman and traveler, as sailor and soldier, and as a colonizer.
      (3) Moral stability: seriousness. His homeland, its liberties, and its local associations and traditions are dear to him; most intimate ties bind him to his family, and to a few chosen friends. A proneness to criticize himself and his surroundings is supplemented by a burdening sense that he must effect reforms. Strictness of conscience, and loyalty to law, order, and justice are his master qualities.

2. *France*
   a. External. The premier nation of Europe for a

thousand years, France is inhabited by a composite race which, despite its provincial differentiations, is homogeneous and nicely tempered. A population of 40,000,000 occupies something over 207,000 square miles (most of it intensively cultivated in small holdings) and controls colonies, largely African, some 4,500,000 square miles in extent.

b. Temperamental.

(1) Long-standing misconception of the French: attributable to centuries of Franco-British conflict; to extreme differences of character; to judgments based superficially on the atypical Parisian type. Excitability, merriment, volubility, and enthusiasm, added to a frank fearlessness of change, have given an impression of lightness, shallowness, and general instability.

(2) The essential soundness of French character: intellectualists and realists, the French have exalted cool reason, sanity, and practicality above illusion and sentiment. Precision of method and sureness of touch are inborn traits, as also are industry and thrift, resourcefulness, and thoroughness. Social beyond all other peoples, the French are distinguished for catholicity and solidarity. They are tolerant, disciplined, and law-abiding as citizens; they are marked by constant political preoccupation, though in an avocational sense, and by a burning devotion to the beloved homeland, *la patrie*.

3. *Belgium*

A people united, though of two contrasted racial types, Gallic and Germanic, numbering some 7,500,000 and occupying 11,000 square miles of territory. Famed of old for courage, and for a jealous guarding of their municipal and national prerogatives, the

Belgians have been tempered by centuries of ceaseless struggle against foreign aggression. Since their separation from Holland in 1831 and the guaranteeing of their neutrality in 1839, they have shown, as often before, wonderful recuperative powers in successfully turning their released energies to the arts of peace. Intensive development, pacifism, and a cosmopolitan outlook are outstanding Belgian characteristics.

4. *Italy*

This country, the home of Mazzini and Garibaldi, has a population of about 35,000,000 occupying 110,000 square miles, and since 1870 has possessed an autonomous government and a place among the "Great Powers." Long committed to an irredentist and imperialistic policy, these ultra-nationalistic expansionist ambitions have to-day given place to a popular acclamation of the allied program of self-determination and internationalism for all states, great and small alike.

5. *Servia and her neighbors*

Small monarchies, largely of peasant stock, living in dreams of past national glory, and in hopes of restoring the political integrity of the past. The Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles deserve special mention.

6. *Portugal*

For over five hundred years a loyal ally of England. A republic since 1912.

7. *The United States*

A "melting pot" 3,000,000 square miles in extent, wonderfully rich in natural resources, and inhabited by 100,000,000 people, on the whole easy-going, freedom-loving, optimistic, and moral. Dominant traits are inventiveness, energy, delight in competition, and a capacity for the organization and operation of vast enterprises.

8. *Latin America*

Once composed of Spanish colonies, now of republics which in emulation of their northern sister have rap-

idly advanced to positions of dignity and consideration in the world's family of nations.

9. *Liberia*

An African republic founded by emancipated American negroes.

10. *Russia, Arabia, Japan*

III. THE DEBT OF DEMOCRACY TO THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED NATIONS

1. *To the French Republic: mother of equalities and of political philosophies*
   a. The ups and downs of French republicanism.
      (1) To 1789—"The Old Regime."
      (2) 1789–92—Through Assembly to First Republic.
      (3) 1793–1804—Through Directory and Consulate to First Empire.
      (4) 1830—Bourgeois Monarchy.
      (5) 1848—Second Republic.
      (6) 1851—Second Empire.
      (7) 1871—Through Commune to Third Republic.
   b. Humanitarian basis of French republicanism: Rousseau; "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity;" social amelioration; governmental machinery as related to the actual life of France.
2. *To the American Federation: pioneer of independence*
   a. American obligation.
      (1) To England, for the Anglo-Saxon birthright of self-government.
      (2) To France, for ideals and formulas underlying our political institutions, as well as for material assistance during the first critical years of national existence.
      (3) Important milestones of democratic progress.
         (a) 1776—The Declaration of Independence: proclaiming the right of one free people to control its own national destinies.

(b) 1823—Monroe's message to Congress: maintaining the right of all American peoples to the same political opportunity enjoyed by the United States.

(c) 1863—Lincoln's memorial address at Gettysburg: reiterating our continued faith in "government of the people, for the people, and by the people."

(d) 1917—Wilson's address to the joint session of Congress: announcing the American determination that the whole world "must be made safe for democracy; its peace planted upon tested foundations of political liberty."

(4 Contributions to democratic institutions:

(a) The federal idea.

(b) The Constitution.

(c) Equal electoral suffrage.

(d) The veto.

(e) Territorial probation.

(f) Pan-Americanism.

(g) The theory of entangling alliances.

3. *To the British Empire: mother of liberty and founder of commonwealths*

a. Ancient tradition of self-government: an evolution, centuries long, toward free institutions, and resulting in autonomous states dwelling voluntarily in an imperial circle. "The Crowned Republic."

b. The commonwealth of British nationalities: in the dependencies and crown colonies, self-direction of all domestic matters; in the protectorates, an apprenticeship in free and civilized institutions under a nation most just and peaceable and free.

c. Tendencies: federalization *vs.* decentralization. Ireland, India, Canada, South Africa, Australasia.

4. *Conclusion: an alliance for peace*

The larger program of democracy: a "League of Nations" to ensure peace, promote mutual understanding, and encourage international coöperation.

TOPIC XI

PEACE TERMS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS AND OF THE ALLIES

Compiled by S. B. SLOAN

I. PEACE PROPOSAL OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

1. *Germany's peace note to the neutral powers, December 12, 1916*

   To the Entente Allies it was rather vague and did not state any terms. The essential point of the note was the following: Germany and her allies did not aim to annihilate their adversaries despite a consciousness of military and economic strength and a readiness to continue the war to the bitter end, but, prompted by a desire to avoid further bloodshed, the four Central Powers proposed to enter into peace negotiations.

2. *Similar note to the Pope on the same date*

   Less boastful and threatening, but no terms were stated.

3. *Austria's contemporaneous separate statement*

   It claimed to be animated "neither by aggressive purposes nor by designs of conquest, but solely by the bitter necessity of self-defense."

4. *The German Chancellor's speech on the same day before the Reichstag*

   He set up self-defense as the cause of the war, and, after boasting of military strength and successes on the battle-field, he denied the charge that the Central Powers "plan to conquer the whole world."

5. *Premier Briand's answer, December 13, 1916*

   Before the Chamber of Deputies he declared that the peace proposal of the Central Powers was vague and indefinite and a crude trap.

6. *The Russian Duma's answer, December 15*

   A categorical refusal to enter into any peace negotiations whatever.

7. *Lloyd-George's reply, December 19*

   Before the House of Commons he insisted upon restitution, reparation, and guarantees from the Central Powers as conditions to peace.

8. *Combined reply of the Entente Allies dated in Paris, December 30*

   It characterized the document of the Central Powers as "pretended propositions of peace" and protested against two essential statements: that the Entente Allies were responsible for the war and that the Central Powers were victorious. The Entente Allies could see in the overtures made by the Central Powers nothing but an effort to impose a German peace, and they refused to consider a proposal which was insincere.

II. PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE SUGGESTIONS

1. *Wilson's note to the belligerent nations, December 18, 1916*

   The President offered certain suggestions looking toward peace which had long been in his mind and had no connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers, but which might be considered with proposals for peace. The President's suggestions and opinions in brief were:

   a. He thought an early occasion should be sought for a statement and comparison of the views and peace terms of the various nations at war.
   b. He would serve in any way that might be acceptable; would even be willing to take the initiative, if only the great object might be attained.
   c. He assumed that the aims of the belligerents were virtually the same.
   d. He emphasized the fact that the concrete objects for which the war was being waged were never definitely stated.

e. He did not propose peace, not even mediation, but he proposed that soundings be taken.

2. *The German Government's brief reply, December 26, 1916*
   a. An immediate exchange of views seemed appropriate.
   b. In the sense of its note of December 12th it proposed an immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerents at a neutral place.
   c. After the end of the present struggle, it would be ready to collaborate with the United States in the exalted task of preventing future wars.

3. *The Entente Allies answer President Wilson, January 10, 1917*
   a. The Entente Allies thought it was impossible at present to attain a peace that would assure reparation, restitution, and the desired guaranties.
   b. The Entente Allies were pleased that President Wilson's communication was not associated in origin with that of the Central Powers of December 12th.
   c. The Entente Allies protested against the assertion that the aims of the two groups of belligerents were similar.
   d. The Entente Allies refused to make known in detail their war aims until the hour of negotiations, but would insist upon the restoration of Belgium, of Servia, and of Montenegro, with indemnities; evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia, and of Roumania, with reparation; reorganization of Europe; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, etc.

III. POPE BENEDICT'S PLEAS FOR PEACE

1. *Vain appeal on the first anniversary of the war*

2. *Second appeal, August 1, 1917*
   The Pope asked for an agreement on the following

points, which seemed to him to offer the basis of a just and lasting peace:

a. The material force of arms must give way to the moral force of right.
b. Simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments.
c. Compulsory arbitration.
d. Freedom and community of the seas.
e. Entire and reciprocal condonation for damages and cost of the war.
f. Reciprocal restitution of occupied territory, including the German colonies.
g. The aspirations of the population should determine in disputed territories.

3. *Reply of the United States*

"To deal with such a power (the ruthless master of the German people) by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of his strength and a renewal of its policy. . . . . We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guaranty of anything that is to endure."

4. *Reply of Germany*

"The German people support his Majesty in his keen desire for peace. . . . The Imperial Government will in this respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people."

5. *Reply of Austria*

"We see in the proposals of your Holiness a suitable basis for initiating negotiations with a view to preparing a peace just to all and lasting."

IV. PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE TERMS

1. *Address before Congress, January 8, 1918*

The President laid down the following essentials for a lasting and honorable peace:

(1) Open covenants of peace without private international understandings.

(2) Absolute freedom of the seas in peace or war except as they may be closed by international action.

(3) Removal of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among nations consenting to peace and pledging themselves for its maintenance.

(4) Guaranties for the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

(5) International adjustment of all colonial claims based on the principle that the peoples concerned have equal weight with the claims of the governments involved.

(6) Evacuation of all Russian territory and a humane settlement of all questions affecting Russia.

(7) Evacuation and restoration of Belgium without any attempt to limit her sovereignty.

(8) All French territory to be freed and restored, and the wrong done in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine to be righted.

(9) Readjustment of Italy's frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

(10) Freest opportunity for autonomous development of the people of Austria-Hungary.

(11) Evacuation of Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, with access to the sea for Serbia, and international guaranties of economic and political independence and territorial integrity of the Balkan states.

(12) Secure sovereignty for the Turkish portion of the Ottoman Empire, assured security of life and opportunity of autonomous development of the other nationalities under Turkish rule, and Dardanelles permanently opened to all nations.

(13) Establishment of an independent Polish state, including territories inhabited by undisputedly Polish population, with free access to the sea, and political and economic independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by international covenant.

(14) General association of nations under specific cove-

nants for mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to large and small states alike.

2. *Address at Mt. Vernon, July 4, 1918*

The President laid stress upon four general principles as follows:

a. The destruction or reduction of every arbitrary power that can disturb the peace of the world.
b. The settlement of every question with respect to the rights of the different countries or peoples invaded.
c. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the principles of justice and honor.
d. The establishment of an organization of peace that will afford a tribunal of opinion to which all must submit.

3. *In an address at New York, September 27, 1918, President Wilson restated many of these ideas, and in addition insisted upon these two things as necessary for real peace:*

a. No special alliances.
b. No economic boycotts.

V. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PEACE FEELER

1. *The Austro-Hungarian note of September 16*

It was presented to the President by the Swedish Minister at 6:30 P. M. on September 16, and answered at 6:45 P. M., and made the following points:

a. It recalled the former attempt of the Quadruple Alliance to bring about peace negotiations (December 12, 1916). Despite its rejection, it made the "question of peace the center of discussion in ever-increasing measure." As a result of these discussions, "it can be stated that the distance between the conceptions of the two sides has, on the whole, grown somewhat less."
b. "President Wilson . . . . has formulated

principles which have not encountered contradiction on the part of his allies, and the far-reaching application of which is likely to meet no objection on the part of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance." It must be remembered, however, that "agreements on general principles are insufficient." Attention must be directed to the practical application.

c. Fruitful progress can not be made in public discussions of the practical applications for fear of "unfavorably influencing feeling at home so as to endanger the interest of their arms" or of "prematurely betraying their own ultimate intentions."

d. The note, therefore, proposed a confidential and unbinding discussion of the basic principles by authorized delegates from all belligerents.

2. *The accompanying note*

The Austro-Hungarian note was accompanied by explanations why Austria hoped that this move would succeed where former attempts had failed.

3. *President Wilson's reply*

"The government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain."

VI. GERMAN PEACE EFFORT

1. *Prince Maximilian's note to President Wilson*

The German Chancellor early in October made three main requests:

a. A peace conference of all the belligerent states should be held.

b. Wilson's fourteen points should be accepted as a basis for negotiations.

c. An armistice should be declared while peace was under consideration.

2. *President Wilson's reply, two days later*
The note consisted mainly of these three questions:
   a. Whether Prince Maximilian spoke for the German government or the German people?
   b. Whether Germany would be willing to evacuate all of the territory her soldiers held?
   c. Whether Germany accepted the fourteen points in fact as well as for a basis of negotiations?

3. *The German Government's reply*
Assurance was given that Maximilian spoke for the German people, that Germany would evacuate conquered territory as a preliminary to an armistice, and that President Wilson's fourteen points were accepted in full. President Wilson was asked to bring about the meeting of a mixed commission to make the necessary arrangements for evacuation.

4. *President Wilson's answer of October 14th*
It laid emphasis on three things:
   a. The process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice must be left to the military advisers of the Allied Powers.
   b. No armistice could be considered so long as the armed forces of Germany continued their illegal and inhuman practices.
   c. The German people must change their form of government so that the future peace of the world may not be endangered.

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